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Abstract
This paper diagnoses a certain culture of complaint, which is a curious formation in
the history of mankind that emerges exactly at the moment where the claim, that
the “grand narratives” have lost their meaning, goes from being merely an academic
postulate to becoming a commonly accepted cultural dogma. Rather than joyfully
accepting the liberation from the ostensibly repressive grand narratives, the reaction
typical of the members of the culture of complaint has been to blame the big Other
for his non-existence. Having discussed this point we proceed to discuss the possibi-
lity of genuine political action, given such a bleak prognosis of our own current
post-modern predicament. Via the literary work of Franz Kafka, a discussion is
opened about the possibilities and constraints on political action in an era where
transcendent legitimization is no longer available. The discussion partners are (first)
Jacques Derrida, and Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari and Jacques Lacan.
Keywords: Culture of complaint, political action, metaphysics, Kafka, Deleuze,
Derrida, Lacan.
So why should I want anything from you? The
court doesn’t want anything from you. It
receives you, when you arrive, and it lets you
go, when you are leaving.
– Franz Kafka, The Trial, (1951, p. 265, our translation).
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0. The Man Who Sued God
There is a certain poetic justice to the fact that Patrick McCarville, who
came up with the original idea for the film “The Man Who Sued God”,
which was finally produced in 2001, was so disappointed at the premiere
that he actually considered suing the producers. Not because he wasn’t
satisfied with the film, but because he wasn’t credited adequately for being
the creator of the actual plot of the movie: “I was promised I would be
credited but when the movie came on there was no sign of my name up
front. […]. Now I find myself relegated to underneath the carpenter and
the cleaning lady [in the credits] and I feel pretty bad about it.” (see Irwin
2001). The film tells the story of an Australian fisherman and former law-
yer, Steve Myers, whose boat is destroyed by lightning. When Myers tries
to collect the insurance money from the incident, he is told that the policy
does not cover cases where accidents are the results of an “Act of God.”
Instead of accepting this rejection, Myers decides to bite the bullet and
sue God himself via His earthly representatives. The plot hasn’t got much
more to it than this, and the movie is rather boring, with mediocre acting
and directing. When McCarville nonetheless complained about the order
of appearance in the acknowledgements, and not about the film itself, it
can probably best be understood in the light of the 38 years it took from
the time when he came up with the idea, until the film was finally pro-
duced. “This was my original idea”, as he said during the shooting of the
film, and “if I do nothing else in my life at least I can say I came up with
‘The Man Who Sued God’.” (Ardell, 2001). His immediate reaction being
that of a complaint, McCarville therefore ironically underlined the one
true accomplishment of the film – to be a radical and satirical illustration
of the “culture of complaint” (Hughes 1993) which we take to character-
ize a broad political and cultural tendency in contemporary Western cul-
ture. Robert Hughes has identified this culture of complaint as, among
other things, an “all-pervasive claim to victimhood” which “tops off Amer-
ica’s long-cherished culture of therapeutics.” Hughes’ point is that, to
make yourself count, you should complain, or at least always be prepared
to complain. “Complaint gives you power.” (Hughes 1993, 12). We follow
Hughes in the identification of a fundamentally important cultural trend
in Western civilization that has only gained in momentum since his defi-
nition of the American culture as a ‘culture of complaint’, but we pursue
it in a more specifically philosophical sense.
In this paper, more precisely, we pursue two questions, which to our
minds are crucial for the understanding of this culture of complaint. First,
there is the descriptive question of what the culture of complaint really is.
What is it that drives the (post)modern subject, which seems to find itself
satisfied only through complaining about dissatisfaction? This question is
dealt with in the following chapter entitled “What Do You Want From
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Me?” Second, there is the normative question of what we should do about
it. Given that the contemporary political climate can meaningfully be de-
scribed as residing in a Stimmung of complaint and thereby a kind of re-
active behaviour to be determinant of our social engagements today, is it
then at all possible to accomplish what could be called a political act, and
if it is, how? This question is discussed in the third chapter entitled “How
to Behead the King Twice.” In between, we will discuss Franz Kafka’s
analysis of the relation between the subject and the Law, especially in The
Trial, as a point of entrance for the identification of the “post-modern
predicament”, if you will, after the fall of the big Other as the ultimate
and meaning-giving guarantor of the moral and political standards in so-
ciety. Recent political interpretations of Kafka in Jacques Derrida and
Gilles Deleuze/Felix Guattari are invoked to set the stage for our own re-
marks on political acts, which claim the necessity of moving beyond their
respective approaches.
It should be mentioned from the start that we take a genuine politi-
cal act to be something other than merely partaking in the activities that
go on in various polities around the globe. A genuine political act is
characterized by reorganising the very coordinates that structure these po-
lities. Such a notion of the political act may be reminiscent of a certain
revolutionary romanticism that is often thought of as belonging some-
where in the spectrum between naivety and utter irresponsible immoral-
ity. No such connection is necessary. The reorganization of the inherited
political coordinates can be accomplished in many ways. In recent times
it could be said that the women’s rights movement reorganised the given
political coordinates, because the particular claims made by this particular
political subject meant the reorganization of society as a whole. The poli-
tical act undertaken by the emerging political subject “Woman”, might
be described as violent in a certain sense, but we would insist that it was
neither naïve nor immoral. Similar observations could be made about the
civil rights movements in the USA and the anti-Apartheid movements in
South Africa, and even about the revolutionary moment in Europe in
the years following the fall of the Berlin Wall. To give yet another exam-
ple, while taking the risk of prophesising, it could be said that today,
more than anything we are in need of a genuine political act that not
only makes us accept that climate changes are caused by us, but also
accept that we may have to stop indulging in some of our most energy
consuming pleasures in order not to destroy the planet we inhabit. Like
women’s rights, climate change could become a political challenge of such
dimensions that it could demand real political and economic changes
(and not just “improved morals”, individual responsibility, etc.).
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1. What Do You Want From Me?
The post-modern subject is telling stories. History has become histories –
there is not one, all-encompassing tale about humanity in which each in-
dividual must find his or her place. Post-modernism is characterized, as
Jean-François Lyotard put it, by “incredulity towards metanarratives” (Lyo-
tard 1984: xxiv). The “grand narratives” of religion, politics and spirit have
become discredited through critique of metaphysics and the ideological
disasters of the 20th century. In other words, both theoretically (in logics,
linguistics, philosophy, and literary theory) as well as practically (in poli-
tics), the 20th century can be seen as a kind of traversing of the fantasy of
a grand narrative that provides the coordinates for human life. A common
reaction, from Lyotard’s epochal definition forward, became to assert the
individual narrative as the only legitimate measure of validity. Each person
has his or her story. The most basic right after the fall of the great narra-
tives of the just and equal society was therefore widely held to be the right
to narrate about oneself. It was in this sense paradigmatic for the Post
Cold War conception of the human being, when Richard Rorty defined
the fundamental dimension of a human being as the ability to suffer, to
experience pain and humiliation, and, since humans are symbolic animals,
the fundamental right to tell one’s own story of suffering (Rorty 1989). I
am only insofar as I narrate myself, and because my narration must always
be a narration that includes phenomena and influences beyond my control
(other people, nature, accidents, death), the story will never be entirely
flawless. The culture of complaint is the condition that has gradually
grown from these premises. It is a condition where the subject finds her-
self unable to account for lacks or inconsistencies in her narration, includ-
ing an explanation for the unpleasant things she experiences, and therefore
she blames the Other for causing the inconsistency, or for being unable to
fix it. The Other, on this account, is the field of the social that continues
to play an immensely important role for the individual, even if there is no
overall narrative that defines the subject’s place and identity within the
social. We draw on Jacques Lacan’s use of the term of the “big Other”, or
the Other with a capital O, to describe this peculiar phenomenon of an
overarching giver of meaning that does not exist, but functions nonethe-
less. The Other plays a role in each of our lives – in early childhood, for
instance, it is incarnated in the mother or the father – that is, it can be
attributed to concrete others, when they are presumed to play the role of
omnipotent or omniscient. The world makes sense, as long as it remains
within the limits of what Father can explain. The analyst, in psychoanaly-
sis, also steps in on behalf of the big Other and plays the role of the
subject supposed to know, someone who is presumed to have the answers,
in order for analysis to make any sense. Obviously, the same goes for God
Almighty. In other words: in order to secure some safe and reliable points
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of reference, we single out particular beings to whom are attributed the
additional authority and capacity of the Other. The Other in this sense is
that which “has a body and does not exist” (Lacan 2007: 66) – it func-
tions via its representatives, it “has their bodies”, but it does not, itself,
exist. The big Other, however, also means the symbolic order at large,
which is why it functions, even when it doesn’t exist: There is no ultimate,
identifiable agent behind the way in which language works and stories are
told, but we proceed mostly as if there were. We must presume some sort
of inherent sense in the system of language or in the social field as such,
in order for us to even begin making sense of our own roles and endea-
vours. The functioning of the Other, even in the absence of its existence,
is the tacit assumption, an everyday unsaid theology, that things must
make sense, the way they are. The Other, thus, might not prescribe mean-
ing and identity to the individual in so many words, but it remains the
addressee as well as the medium through which the narrative must be con-
structed. I narrate myself through the Other and expect my narration to
be heard by someone, a generalized Other, sometimes instantiated in con-
crete others. Thus, even though the grand narratives fail to exert their
direct influence, the Other remains a silent partner that is expected to
hear what the subject has to say, including what obstructs him or her in
creating the perfect and meaningful individual story.
It is easy to simplify the story about the end of the grand narratives,
though. The incredulity about the grand, overall, determining tales of reli-
gion and ideology has not meant that no other stories than the purely
individual prevail. Every individual is simultaneously part of numerous
stories that count concrete others – partners, families, friends, institutions,
ethnic groupings, sexual or life style kindred spirits, nations – and indeed
religions. The picture has certainly become more blurred, and the rigidity
of overall systematic structures been dramatically reduced, but it would be
a fallacious argument to claim that this condition has left us with only
individual means of construction of meaning. Much more precisely, the
pressure on the individual in the post-ideological condition of liberalist
individualism could be described as the responsibility of assuming respon-
sibility for constructing a coherent narrative out of numerous levels of
identity and meaning; stories that intersect and contradict each other. The
omnipotent Other behind all the occurrences in the world has not been
replaced by an omnipotent individual with full autonomy and access to
sovereign, unhindered narration. Therefore, a paradoxical longing for
someone to hold responsible is re-emerging. Someone to sue for the light-
ning and the unforeseen, and someone to address, when all the various
influences in our lives cannot be synthesized into unproblematic coher-
ence.
Our claim is that this condition, the culture of complaint, is a logical
consequence of the gradual disintegration of overarching metanarratives
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since at least Nietzsche’s announcement of the death of God. Nietzsche
also identified a particular need for the Other, which seems to have run
through human history at large (see Nietzsche 1956). The culture of com-
plaint that we are living now, in this perspective, is not so much a radical
novelty, but rather an historical moment of dispersed metanarratives and a
plurality of minor and major narratives in their place. That is a point that
will become clearer once we have taken a closer look at the metaphysics of
the culture of complaint.
Even though we follow this diagnosis of dispersed metanarratives, we
nevertheless argue that there is a metaphysical background to the culture
of complaint. That is the case simply because it can be demonstrated that
no matter what narrative one should choose to tell (grand or small) there
is a structure of narration that always imposes itself. Crucially, however,
this is not a structure that is founded upon any notion of substance, es-
sence, God, the one, the subject, etcetera. Instead the structure of narra-
tion is a structuring that takes place around an internal inconsistency, an
impossibility, even. The impossibility of a coherent self telling a flawless
story is the metaphysical background of the particular relation between self
and Other in the age of post-modern incredulity towards the stability and
legitimacy of a big Other that provides a firm grounding of the social field.
What we are claiming is thus that there is an inherent obstacle in any
narrative, which unfolds on the individual as well as on any other level.
This impossibility can be explained in the following way. On the one
hand there is the “I”, which is being narrated, which is experiencing this
pain, this joy, this unhappy love affair, which is reading this book, etcetera.
On the other hand there is the “I”, which is telling the story of the first I.
The crucial inconsistency of this structure of narration becomes clear
when we consider the possibility of including the second “I” in the story,
which it is telling of the first. Such a move would mean the emergence of
a third “I”, which would be narrating the inclusion of the second “I” in
the story about the first. And so on ad infinitum.1 The crucial point is
1 This way of presenting the structure of self-relating has a very striking philosophical
history. It was made to be one of the most crucial problems discussed by the German
Idealists Fichte, Hegel and Schelling from the moment Fichte discussed the complex
structure of the I in the first part of the Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre
(Fichte 1971 [1794]). Particularly Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (1970 [1807]) could
be said to investigate in detail the development consciousness necessarily undergoes as a
result of this kind of inherent inconsistency. When Hegel thus states that the truth is
the whole (1970, 24), the point is exactly not that the whole can be given in any kind
of finite form of narration. Rather, the point is that consciousness is condemned to
experience again and again that no matter what it posits as the whole, this whole will
always turn out to be contingent to the point from which it is posited. “The truth is
the whole” means that the whole is uneasy, broken, and not able to fit itself. A more
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that one is never fully at home in the narration one gives of oneself. The
very structure of narration itself takes shape around this inconsistency,
which in turn should be understood as a true metaphysical condition, in
that it addresses the relation of being and language as such. What is re-
vealed in this inconsistent structure of narration is the monstrous being –
the “I” or the subject – which refuses integration into language. Further-
more, given the conclusion that the narrator never fits into the story he is
telling about the world, the inverse point follows that the world, which is
being narrated, is equally incomplete. No matter which story the mon-
strous I is trying to tell, it will always be the case that it in some way is
broken and incoherent, exactly because it is being told from a vantage
point that does not fit the narration itself.
Accepting this argument means accepting the point that there never
was a coherent narrator and a coherent big Other to whom the story was
told. It is not the case that there once was a coherent God above, a com-
plete world below, and a coherent subject acting somewhere between
them; nor is it the case that these grand narratives suddenly became false
at a certain point in history. Instead, concrete historical formations should
be understood through the way in which the gap at the heart of the self
and the gap at the heart of the Other are filled up with some kind of
substitute temporary completeness. The term ‘metaphysics’ in so far as it
is taken to denominate a specific story about the fundamental structure
and coherent ground of the world, should therefore always be taken to
describe the reaction of a specific time, a concrete historical formation, to
the fundamental metaphysical incoherence. All grand narratives were stor-
ies told in order to help us forget that there can be no coherent grand
narratives.
This brings with it some crucial consequences for the formation we
are investigating here, namely the metaphysics of the culture of complaint.
What happened with the post-modern announcement of the end of all
grand narratives should not be understood as a radical break with the way
narrations are structured. Rather it meant that the fundamental impossi-
bility of coherent narration itself became the theme of the narration. Post-
modernism could in this sense very well be seen as the final step in a
Hegelian movement of the world spirit coming to terms with itself (be-
yond the steps that were visible to Hegel himself). The self-realization of
world spirit is exactly what takes place the moment world spirit realizes
that it is already dead.2 The culture of complaint is a curious formation
recent but very elegant discussion of the necessary flaw at the heart of the structure of
narration is found in Judith Butler’s Giving an Account of Oneself (2005).
2 Incidentally, this seemingly very anti-Hegelian Hegelianism is not so anti-Hegelian
after all. It is a crucial feature of Hegel’s interpretation of the Religion of Revelation
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that takes place at the precise moment where the notion that God is dead
becomes a part of the commonly accepted narratives.
What happens in the culture of complaint is absolutely not that the
notion of God’s death is triumphantly cried out from every rooftop, and
that we can from here on finally take our lives in our own hands. Instead,
the crucial manoeuvre of this particular culture consists in complaining to
God that he never existed after all. In this precise sense there is a genuine
metaphysics pertaining to the culture of complaint, a metaphysics in the
sense of a concrete formation of the story of why there is no gap at the
heart of narration. Only this metaphysics is functioning in a rather sur-
prising way since it is effectively filling the gap at the centre of narration
with the very gap itself.
The tragedy of much post-modernist theory about the end of grand
narratives is thus the curious fact that the completion of the treatment
seems not to have cured the patient. We still exhibit symptoms and cling to
the big Other as the explanation of them, even though we have learned that
he does not exist. As Slavoj Žižek has described it very precisely, we paradoxi-
cally seem to be blaming the big Other that he doesn’t exist. This is Žižek:
… far from cheerfully assuming the non-existence of the big Other, the subject
blames the Other for its failure and/or impotence, as if the Other is guilty of the
fact that he doesn’t exist, that is, as if impotence is no excuse – the big Other is
responsible for the very fact that it wasn’t able to do anything: the more the sub-
ject’s structure is ‘narcissistic’, the more he puts the blame on the big Other, and
asserts his dependence on it (Žižek 2000, p. 361).
The crucial point about the culture of complaint is thus a certain paradox,
which bears a striking similarity to the development from ‘false conscious-
ness’ to ‘enlightened false consciousness’ described by Peter Sloterdijk in
his Kritik der zynischen Vernunft (1983). According to Sloterdijk, enlight-
enment arrives at an impasse in the phenomenon of zynicism (which Slo-
terdijk argues to be entirely different from classical Greek cynicism), be-
cause what is encountered in zynicism is the paradox that even though the
post-modern self-narrators know very well that there are terrible conse-
quences to the practices they are enmeshed in, and that there is no one
else “besides” themselves to blame for them, (the ever more threatening
climate catastrophe would be an obvious example here), they nevertheless
keep on doing what they do. In the culture of complaint, the non-exis-
tence of the big Other is as clear as day, but we nonetheless blame him for
towards the end of the Phenomenology of Spirit (1970, 545ff) that the ultimate result
of incarnation is the fact that God must die. And not merely in the form of the
incarnated Son. The God who dies on the cross is the transcendent substance – the
God of the beyond. A recent and very powerful reading of these crucial passages in
Hegel is found in Alenka Zupančič’s The Odd One In (Zupančič 2008, 36–40).
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this fact; we keep up the practice of transposing the responsibility for our
problems to the big Other. Even if we are well aware that the Other does
not exist, we seek someone to fill in his shoes once again – someone who
can explain and give sense to the way things are going. (We blame the
companies and the polticians for failing to deal adequately with imposing
climate changes, but yet we continue buying the same cheap, unsustainable
commodities and elect the politicians that de facto promise us not to take
sufficiently radical measures).
In the field of psychoanalytic practice we find another very striking
analogy. Here, the fall of the big Other signifies the end of the psycho-
analytic treatment. If the analyst, in the beginning, as it was said, functions
as a stand-in on behalf of the big Other, analysis can be finalized only
when the Other falls; when the subject supposed to know is revealed to
have been, precisely, only a stand-in, and not to have the answer after all.
However, this also marks the point of great risk for the subject of the
analysis. If, that is, the treatment is completed in the sense that the analy-
sand comes to realize that “there was nothing there” – that, for example,
the paranoiac obsession was caused by herself, and not by a “real” threat
or danger from the Other, then this immediately seems to be a great lib-
eration. There was nothing to fear, as it were. The curious fact is that
sometimes the direct opposite of relief is the result. The completion of the
treatment implies a real danger of a psychotic breakdown, since the subject
comes to realize that she has no support in the big Other; that it “doesn’t
want anything from her”. If that is true – then what am I? What should I
do? Psychoanalytic patients tend to cling on to their symptoms even after
they have been interpreted adequately. “I know very well that I am blam-
ing my father only because I cannot bear the abyss of responsibility in
doing something about it myself, but nevertheless… I keep blaming my
father.”
So, the traumatic realisation of the non-existence of the big Other im-
plies a radical awareness of the responsibility of one’s own identity-forma-
tion with all its flaws and inconsistencies. In order to escape the conse-
quences of this awareness (which would imply that I would have to
change myself), the subject tends to look for an outside obstacle to the
fullness and harmony of its identity. The absence of the Other, one could
say, is compensated through the discovery–creation of an other as stand-
in, in the almost literal sense of standing-in-the-way of the subject’s crea-
tive and autonomous self-realization. Things aren’t working well, because
of …. the Jews/Gypsies/Muslims/Unemployed/Waitresses/TV-hosts …
The post-modern conception of the right to narrate oneself in this way
unfolds as a construction of a coherent story of identity-formation, which
is unfortunately obstructed from the outside. Or put in another way: I
exist, I subsist, I uphold my existence by clinging on to my symptom, in
so far as I am obstructed/suffering in this particular way.
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In this way we immediately take the plunge back into metaphysics,
exactly at the moment when we believe that we have made the most radi-
cal separation from it. The more we think we free ourselves from the
grand narratives of the past, the more we seem to end up relying upon
them. This indeed is a precarious situation. It is one that seems to render
any sort of radical emancipatory political action impossible. And so the
present argument could at this stage be seen as having a rather conserva-
tive demeanour, since it seems as if whatever we do to break free from the
chains of History, we are doomed to fail, because the metaphysical condi-
tions that underlie all history are only strengthened by our attempts to
escape them.
Our point is not to argue the futility of politics – in fact we wish to
argue exactly the opposite. But it follows from the present argument that
there are certain kinds of so-called political practice that are essentially
futile or even counterproductive. One of them is the practice of suing
God for not being there. In other words the practice of consistently pla-
cing blame on the Other, in whatever shape the Other might be con-
ceived. The modern world is capable of delivering an unlimited range of
new objects that can be inserted as ‘that which can be blamed for my lack
of access to full enjoyment’. The form of politics that has the identifying
of the one thing (Gypsies, Jews, Journalists, Muslims, Intellectuals, etc.
etc.), which inhibits my enjoyment, as its raison d'etre, is of course reac-
tionary and entirely unproductive.
But equally problematic is the practice that could be termed the liberal
or multiculturalist agenda of establishing an order of recognition of the
various identities within the symbolic order. This agenda focuses on the
right of a culturally defined group of individuals to construct their iden-
tity, which entails a representation of the big Other as the protector of
this right. By so doing, this agenda undermines the possibility of a more
radical question about the status of the symbolic order itself, let alone the
subject’s own position within it. The liberal/multiculturalist agenda is zy-
nicism in its most pure form, because it makes any questioning of any
notion of the big Other impossible. Everyone is entitled to his own zynical
pathologies, and since there is no justification for others to impose their
values and views onto their neighbours, (Muslims have no right telling
gays how to live, etc.), the Other is reasserted as the neutral benefactor
that leaves everyone in peace. This is why everything should be done very
carefully in the culture of complaint. Be careful not to violate the other by
describing her in inappropriate ways, by harassing her, disturbing her, not
warning her (that her coffee might be hot), or, indeed: putting her name
too low in the list of acknowledgements.
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2. This entrance was only meant for you
As we mentioned in the beginning there are two sides to the argument we
are making. The second part of the argument is going to deal with the
problem of the possibility of genuine political action. Given the points
that have been presented so far, that problem can now take the form of
the following question: What does it mean to act politically, when the big
Other is no longer there to rebel against?
In order to approach this question, we will try to tackle the issue of
the Law in Kafka’s work. The reason for taking up Kafka here should be
mentioned first. In their Kafka. Toward a Minor Literature (1986) Gilles
Deleuze and Félix Guattari argue that Kafka should be seen as part of a
larger tendency that gained in force towards the end of the Hapsburg em-
pire.
At random, we can cite the following among Kafka’s contemporaries: Einstein and his
deterritorialization of the representation of the universe […]; the Austrian dodecapho-
nists and their deterritorialization of musical representation […]; the expressionist
cinema and its double movement of deterritorialization and reterritorialization of the
image […]. Of course, we should mention Viennese psychoanalysis and Prague school
linguists. (Deleuze and Guattari 1986, p. 24).
The general idea here is obvious and well known. Important changes oc-
curred in the beginning of the 20th century. It was as if the end of World
War One meant the ultimate and irrevocable fall of the Ancien Régime.
Here, finally, the King was beheaded. Both the Hapsburg and the Zarist
empires fell. In other words what Deleuze and Guattari identify as the
crucial events of Kafka and his time are precisely the beginning of the
development that has ended up with the formation that we are here term-
ing the culture of complaint. Our ambition with taking up Kafka is there-
fore to try to see if there could be given any alternative outcomes to the
fall of the big Other, other than the situation in which it has become a
common sport to sue him for the fact that he was never there after all.
We find in Kafka a sort of world historic impact of the coming-to-aware-
ness of humanity that there is no big Other that wants something particu-
lar with us and our lives.
According to Deleuze and Guattari it was not only the ancient forms
of power that became antiquated in the process they term deterritorializa-
tion. In all areas of life the general experience was that of a weakening of
the sense and explanatory force of the concepts of the old world. Follow-
ing the description of Deleuze and Guattari, the overarching experience of
Kafka and his contemporaries was one of deterritorialization. Where the
big Other used to act as the determinant force that divided the world in
territories, his fall meant the disappearance of the coordinates through
which we used to understand exteriority and interiority. It should be
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noted that deterritorialization is not merely something that takes place
in geography. Rather it is first and foremost something that takes place
in the register of sense and meaning. It was the inherited coordinates of
belonging, the cartography of possible subject-positions, that were dis-
solved.3
The point that essential changes occurred in Europe and ultimately in
world society as a whole at the beginning to the middle of the 20th cen-
tury, while important, is hardly surprising. To describe these processes of
change under the heading of deterritorialization does make great sense,
but it still leaves a question to be answered regarding the scope and range
of that process. Particularly important is the question whether deterritoria-
lization can at all be completed in the way envisioned by Deleuze and
Guattari. Is it possible to conceive of the fall of the big Other in such a
way that the post-modern storytellers do not continue to cling to his ab-
sence in any way? Is there a way in which deterritorialization might result
in emancipation?
Taking up Kafka in the attempt to tackle this question makes sense,
not only because of the historical reasons mentioned above, but also be-
cause his work more than anything seems to evolve around this question:
What is it like to live in a world where the big Other no longer exists?
Accordingly, widely divergent readings are available. Some claim that Kaf-
ka’s is a work about the disappearance of the Law into an absolute and
secluded transcendence. Representative of this reading is Jacques Derrida
(see e.g., 1990, 1992).
The other reading that we will consider is that of Deleuze and Guat-
tari. Their central point is to insist on the possibility of completing the
process of deterritorialization, and that only by doing so, can it become
emancipatory in its own right. The true catastrophe, according to Deleuze
and Guattari, would be to stop at a half-way-point, where the fall of the
big Other only results in an exchange of a positive transcendence (which
assigns territories and subject-positions in a clear and direct manner) for a
negative one (which stops assigning territories and subject-positions, but
which nevertheless succeeds in making us despair in the futile pleading to
the big Other that he should give us these assignments once again).
The common feature of Derrida on the one hand and Deleuze and
Guattari on the other is the diagnosis that the experience of (post-)moder-
nity, which surfaces in Kafka, is one in which the relation between law
3 There is one more point, which should be made with regard to the above quotation.
Deleuze and Guattari are ostensibly dragging their feet in saying “Of course, we
should mention Viennese psychoanalysis and Prague school linguists.” It is clear that
they are not thrilled at the prospect of giving any ground to psychoanalysis. Indeed,
“Oedipus” could rightly be said to be the prime target of their critical endeavour.
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and justice is severed. When the big Other falls, there is no longer anyone,
who can guarantee that there is a link between law and justice. There is
no longer a grand narrative that tells us that if we abide the law, in the
end justice will be served. In order to be able to explicate the consequences
of this chiasm in Derrida and Deleuze and Guattari respectively, it will be
helpful to introduce a terminological distinction within the concept of the
law, which is not always clear in their respective works. We thus distin-
guish between the law as that which is the object of study in a specific
academic discipline, which is the object of political debates, and which is
applied in the courtroom on the one hand, and the Law, which guarantees
the link between the law in the first sense and justice. When we thus say
that Kafka’s work should be seen as the exposition of life in the age of the
absence of the big Other, we could also describe it as the description of
life after the disappearance of the Law.
The ways in which Derrida on the one hand Deleuze and Guattari on
the other interpret this disappearance are widely different. To Derrida the
result is that justice is forever lost in the transcendent realm. Justice is
always “to come” (avenir) (1990: 993). Whatever justice is, it is that which
we can never quite reach, but which we must nevertheless strive towards;
justice is infinitely postponed into the future, but that only puts a demand
on us to enact it. To Deleuze and Guattari however, the fact that the Law
loses its meaning, which follows from its inability to guarantee justice,
does not mean that we lose contact with justice. Quite the opposite in
fact. The inexplicability of the Law does not mean a loss of justice. It
rather means the dissolution of the grand narrative, which not only stipu-
lated the link between law and justice, but also and more importantly, that
we had to go through the law in order to arrive at justice. No longer hav-
ing to pass through the law in order to arrive at justice, the separation of
the link between justice and law results in justice being immediately acces-
sible to us. “Justice is desire and not law.” (1986: 49).
2.1 Transcendence
In the transcendence-reading, the law is characterized by utter indecipher-
ability. We are always “Before the Law” like the man from the country in
the parable from The Trial that bears that name. In this story the man
from the country arrives at the gates of the Law and asks for permission
to enter of the doorkeeper there. He is told that he cannot enter at the
moment, and so he sits himself in front of the gates to the Law. He ends
up waiting there for the rest of his life, until at the very end, just before
he dies, the doorkeeper tells him that the entrance in fact “was meant for
him alone” – which of course is the origin of our title.
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To understand this parable in terms of transcendence it is clear that
the crux of the matter is this last remark. If the entrance to the Law was
only meant for the man from the country, how could it then be transcen-
dent or completely out of reach and therefore inexplicable? The point is
that the transcendence of the Law does not simply effect the exclusion of
the man from the country from its interior. If that were the case he would
have been able to safely return home having been denied entrance. The
story would have been a case of “each to his own”, the man would have
had his, and the Law would have had its. The point is of course that the
man is already in the Law, being positioned outside it at its gates. Our
exclusion from the Law is at the same time our inclusion into it. It is
because the Law is out of reach that we are caught in its power. The
transcendence of the Law is therefore not due to its being behind closed
doors. Rather, the transcendence of the Law is due to its openness. Exactly
because the Law does not want anything from us, because “It receives you,
when you arrive, and it lets you go, when you are leaving”, therefore we
cannot decipher its meaning, which remains forever transcendent. This
most radical openness therefore turns out to be the hiding place of the
Law; openness revolves into indisclosure. The transcendence of the Law
does not mark a border impossible to cross, rather it is the shape of a Law
that never reveals its intent.
Descriptively, the transcendence reading is to some extent on a par
with the analysis we gave above of the culture of complaint. If we are right
in our claim that the moment of liberation from the big Other so far only
seems to result in an increased attachment to him, then there certainly is
something to be said for the notion of empty transcendence. Derrida does
not stop at the descriptive level. He draws normative conclusions as well.
Given the transcendence of the Law, justice seems equally lost. To Derrida
justice is incalculable (1990: 971). But that is only half the truth. The
other half is found in the infinite demand that is placed upon us, who are
positioned before the law. Because we are left without a clue as to how
justice should be calculated, since there is no sign from the now transcen-
dent and thus infinitely distant Other to tell us how we are to calculate,
we ourselves are required to invent our own way of doing it. “Incalculable
justice requires us to calculate” (ibid.).
To our minds this conclusion is too weak. The transcendence-reading
of Kafka is one of negative theology. There is transcendence, but it is an
entirely empty one. The transcendent Other no longer tells us, what we
should do, but the empty form of the demand remains. This empty form
of the demand, however, not only tells us that it does not tell us what we
should do, it also tells us that nothing can ever reclaim the transcendent
position of enunciation. No particular project can ever again claim the
universal position, from where it can be said, what is the good for all.
From this point on the transcendence reading fails to give the necessary
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account of genuine political action, which we announced in the introduc-
tion. Because of this structure of negative transcendence, any political pro-
ject, which tries to reorganize the very coordinates of our current political
practice, which seeks a revolution in the method of calculation, immedi-
ately seems illegitimate. No one can justly claim a position outside of the
given method of calculating justice.
The transcendence reading at best ends up in bed with what we
termed the liberal or multiculturalist agenda of reciprocal recognition for
all. Since the only external rule is the one stating that there can be no
external rules, everyone is entitled to be recognized, which means to be a
factor in the calculation of justice. There is of course a democratic ideal to
be defended in the demand for universal recognition. But the exclusion of
external critiques of the method of calculation first and foremost means
that what everyone is entitled to is to have his or her story of the preva-
lence of the big Other recognized. Paradoxically, therefore, the infinite
transcendence of the big Other simultaneously means its proliferation –
everyone is entitled to his own story of why the big Other is still alive and
well.
2.2 Immanence
Leaving the field of transcendence, we can now approach what appears to
be a more promising path of immanence. We say promising, because the
most crucial feature of Deleuze and Guattari’s reading is their insistence
upon leaving all signs of melancholy and sadness behind. Here the inex-
plicability of the law in no way causes an experience of loss or even stress.
Rather, it is a cause of joy. This places their reading in direct opposition
to the negative theology that we saw was an integrated part of the trans-
cendence reading (see e.g., Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 43ff.).4
The crux of the problem, which Deleuze and Guattari find in the idea
of the transcendence of the Law and the connected negative theology, is
the interiorizing of guilt. Indeed, by placing it in the entirely negative
realm of transcendence, meaning in the pure empty formalism of an infi-
nite demand, we, the subjects of the Law, are made to be inherently guilty.
4 It also means that we have already placed ourselves in opposition to them, simply by
focussing on the parable “Before the Law.” In The Trial the parable is told (by a
priest) in the chapter “In the Cathedral”, which is the penultimate of the book, as we
know it today. The claim of Deleuze and Guattari is that both “In the Cathedral”
and the final chapter, which describes K’s execution, have been misguidedly placed at
the end of the novel by Max Brod, who was all too convinced of his own thesis of
negative theology. And so the very focus upon the parable, seems to position us at
some distance from the reading of Deleuze and Guattari.
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The only thing we know of the transcendent Law is that it demands
something, which we can never adequately accommodate. The Derridaian
point that incalculable justice requires us to calculate, can to Deleuze and
Guattari only mean the demand that we should invent our own ways of
restraining desire. The infinitely transcendent Law is equal to infinite and
irrevocable guilt. It is the sadness that is installed in the subject alongside
this guilt, which clearly seems to turn the stomach of Deleuze and Guat-
tari. But they also claim to see that it is something entirely different that
is going on in Kafka’s novels.
First and foremost the Law is not inexplicable because of its transcen-
dence. It is not so much the fact that the Law does not reveal itself that
makes it indecipherable. Rather it is because it continuously reveals itself
to be somewhere else. In the building of the Law there is always another
door. The Law is indecipherable, not because it is always only to come,
but because it was always already right next door. To the credit of Deleuze
and Guattari this point is evident even (cf. note 5) in the parable “Before
the Law”, which was supposed to be the cardinal point for the transcen-
dence approach. “But beware,” the doorkeeper says, “I am powerful. And I
am only the lowest of the doorkeepers. From room to room there are
doorkeepers; one more powerful than the other. Already the gaze of the
third I cannot even bear myself” (Kafka 1951, p. 256, our translation).
Once we give up on the notion of the transcendence of the Law, an
entirely different reading of Kafka becomes possible, according to Deleuze
and Guattari. With it “the idea of the tragic, of the internal drama, of the
intimate tribunal, and so on” disappear (1986: 45). And they claim that
this way of seeing the work is much more in line with what is actually in
the text than the sad transcendence of the Law could ever be. Deleuze and
Guattari thus believe that the negative theology and the notion of empty
transcendence is descriptively wrong – first and foremost with regard to
Kafka, but second of all with regard to the phenomena of deterritorializa-
tion, which we saw them describe as his contemporaries above. Their
claim is that deterritorialization is in fact brought to its fulfilment in Kaf-
ka, and that it is only the interpreters of negative theology who drag him
back into some figure of transcendence.5
5 They acknowledge that “Kafka holds out the bait” as they say (1985:45). “He holds
it out even, and especially, to Oedipus; not from complacency but because he wants
to make a very special use of Oedipus to serve his diabolical purpose” (ibid.). A com-
ment that very nicely brings us back to the issue of psychoanalysis. Why is it that
Deleuze and Guattari are so keen to counterpoise themselves to psychoanalysis? To
them the problem posed by Oedipus is the idea that Law precedes desire. It is the
idea that it is only because there is Law, which forbids, that we learn to desire that
which is forbidden. In this sense the whole crux of the Oedipus complex can be
found in the fact that Oedipus flees his home, when he is told that he shall kill his
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Their project is, in other words, normative first and descriptive sec-
ond. More than anything Deleuze and Guattari see Kafka as a prophet –
as an example to be followed. And in the wake of this they point out the
reactionary inclination hidden in any descriptive approach to his work,
which sees in it a negative theology.
The crucial question is, of course, if the same thing can be said for
the culture of complaint. Are we simply doing a great injustice to a thor-
oughly emancipatory movement, when we interpret the post-modern
storytellers as subjected to something that could be said to be reminiscent
of negative theology? Do we not simply miss the true emancipatory po-
tential that is unfolding itself right before our eyes in the culture where
everyone is able to tell his own story and accordingly make up his own
trajectory in life? That could probably be argued. Nevertheless, if we in-
vestigate the description given by Deleuze and Guattari, we believe that
we can show how this alleged emancipatory potential itself hides a very
specific transcendent demand. This in turn has the advantage of enabling
us to show how the two approaches to Kafka presented here are very
much alike with regard to one specific theme that is crucial to the culture
of complaint.
According to Deleuze and Guattari, K’s experiences in The Trial are
not the sufferings of someone, who is desperately searching for meaning
and ultimately the Law. Rather, K. is seen as someone experimenting
with the world he encounters. K. is a machine that is constantly on the
lookout for other machines, to which he can attach himself. The ques-
tion for him is never, is this right or wrong, nor is it, am I being treated
justly or not, but simply: how does this function? How can I connect to
that? To them The Trial should be seen as an unending series of experi-
ments and couplings. It should be noted in this regard that the transla-
tion of the title of the work from the German Der Prozess to the Eng-
father and have incestuous relations with his mother (which of course leads him on
the path to killing his true father and marrying his true mother) (see Sophocles). The
reason for the flight of Oedipus is that given the prophecy, which tells him that he
will do what the Law forbids, he discovers that he really wants to. This leaves desire
as something entirely reactive and secondary. Just like we can only ever reach justice
through the Law, so too can we only ever reach desire through the law. But this
structure of the Law does not stop at that. It also pits desire and justice as the abso-
lute opposites of each other. In this sense justice becomes equal to taking flight from
desire. As we remember their conclusion is the exact opposite. Once we get rid of the
Law, we are able to discover an immediate link between justice and desire. One
should be careful here. Justice is desire only if desire is not determined by the law
that forbids. Only if we can fully free ourselves from the principle that the Law is the
author of desire, can we say that desire is equal to justice. And this is indeed what
Deleuze and Guattari find expressed in Kafka.
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lish The Trial easily makes us lose sight of the crucial duality to the Ger-
man term ‘Prozess’. While a ‘Prozess’ can rightly be translated strictly
into a juridical process, it can also be used more generally as the English
term process: for example, in chemistry as aerobic- and anaerobic pro-
cesses. In this sense Der Prozess is exactly experimentally following a pro-
cess of continuous coupling.
In Deleuze and Guattari’s thought, such experimentation points to-
wards the idea that desire should be seen as productive in its own right.
Desire is a machine. It produces. Not because there are hindrances to be
overcome, but because it attaches itself to other machines which produce.
This is the opening of their perhaps most famous collaborative work,
Anti-Oedipus: “It is at work everywhere, functioning smoothly at times, at
other times in fits and starts. It breathes, it heats, it eats. It shits, it fucks.
What a mistake to have ever said the id. Everywhere it is machines – real
ones, not figurative ones: machines driving other machines, machines
being driven by other machines, with all the necessary couplings and con-
nections […]. The breast is a machine that produces milk, and the mouth
is a machine coupled to it” (2004: 1). Desire is life unfolding itself. Taking
this notion of desire as the principle through which political action should
be thought is nothing exceptional. It could very well be described as the
political project of the Multitude as it is conceived by Antonio Negri and
Michael Hardt – more than anything it is the guiding idea behind their
much debated collaborative work (Hardt and Negri 2001a, 2001b). This
project concerns the proliferation of forms of life. There is not one subject
that is the adequate author of genuine political acts (be it the people, the
working class, the women, the queer). Rather there is the fundamental
force of life unfolding itself in a multiple way. There are loose couplings
and assemblages, but there cannot be any fundamental form that deter-
mines the adequacy of couplings and connections. There is only the idea
that the more and the more varied the better. This idea carries with it a
particular notion of democracy. A democracy not of individuals, but of
desires. As long as desire is not fostered in reaction to the Law, it should
be recognised alongside all others.
While there certainly is something refreshing in a less “Kafkaesque”
reading of Kafka, we find that there is at least one problem with this read-
ing, if it is to by utilized in our current context of giving sense to the
notion of a genuine political action after the fall of the big Other. In
Deleuze and Guattari we are set free to live out our desires. We are to
joyfully make connections in an open field of immanence. The question
is, however, whether the slightest of demands is still lurking, even as desire
is set free in this way. Namely, the demand that we ought to follow our
desire. This is no simple demand. Indeed, it could easily be identified as
the overarching imperative of our current post-modern predicament. What-
ever you do, be sure to always enjoy yourself. The absence of prohibitions
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is thus never simple absence – it is itself a prohibition. Not only are there
no prohibitions; they are prohibited.
In this way the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari secretly end up in
the very same place as Jacques Derrida! On a par with what we above
termed the liberal or multiculturalist agenda of mutual recognition. As we
described above, this agenda consists in entitling everyone to tell their
own particular story of how the big Other is still alive and well. If we
follow their thought of deterritorialization, there is certainly no longer
one big narrative (of the Law) that determines inside and outside, or that
can tell right from wrong. And that is the good news. Completely freed
from the binary logics that accompany such an overarching narrative, we
can finally achieve the liberation of desire and justice, according to De-
leuze and Guattari. But once we see that this liberation in itself carries
with it the demand that one should live out ones desire, the big Other
returns in the form of the universal prohibition to prohibit. Aren’t we to-
day getting precisely the message from 1968, “It is prohibited to prohibit”,
back in a perverted form? Everyone is entitled to his or her own perver-
sions. Everyone is entitled to his own form of submission to the demand
that we should always strive to enjoy ourselves. Maybe one could even talk
of a “perverse core of multiculturalism”…
3. How to Behead the King Twice
In the end the two readings of Kafka and the trajectories they present for
political thought in our current predicament seem very much alike. The
big Other never really disappeared in either of them. How can that be? In
terms of the transcendence-reading this is utterly clear. What occurs here
at the moment of the fall of the big Other is not that the big Other
himself disappears. He only stops telling us what he wants from us. As we
saw, that can only result in the demand put to us being that much stron-
ger. We no longer have the big Other’s blessing in the form of the guaran-
tee of the Law that tells us that if we follow the law, then justice will be
served in the end. We are left to make our own guarantees, but we are
also required not to utter them in any sort of universalizing voice. The
place of the big Other is to be left empty. Therefore all we can do is to
calculate justice as we best see fit, according to the rules that we already
have.
In the immanence reading, the big Other definitely has fallen. There
is no longer any Guilt because there is no longer any demands put on us
at all, not even the empty ones that figure in the negative theology of
the transcendence reading. But it turns out that the big Other returns in
the form of the demand that we should all live out our pleasures. God is
not dead, he is unconscious. It is this emerging of a new transcendent
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demand at the very heart of the immanence of desire that Deleuze and
Guattari are not able to account for (see Dolar 2006: 166). The radical
immanence reading in the end lacks the tools to describe why we keep
insisting that there could be some transcendent meaning to the Law. Or
to speak in psychoanalytic terms, it cannot give a description of why we
keep on clinging to the big Other even after we have witnessed his fall.
To use the words of Mladen Dolar: “There might be no inside and there
might be no outside, but the problem of the intersection remains.”
(ibid.)
So, the political implication of an alternative reading of Kafka could
be that the silence of the Other should be interpreted in another way than
in both Derrida and Deleuze/Guattari. While we agree with the latter that
it is not enough to modestly and indefinitely aspire to guess what the
Other could have wanted with his demand, we also do not accept that we
are simply left with our own musings of finding new and interesting ways
to live out our desire. Surprisingly enough, the liberation of desire as it is
described by Deleuze and Guattari results in their not being able to live
up to the psychoanalytic dictum “do not cede upon your desire” (Lacan
1997, p. 321). To never cede to one’s desire does not mean to simply
strive to get what one wants. Rather, it means insisting upon desiring in-
stead of achieving the immediate aim of one’s desire. To never cede to
one’s desire means choosing to desire, when faced with the choice between
desiring and the object of one’s desire. It means the realization that there
cannot be a definite answer as to what one desires. And it means embra-
cing this fact. This is the ultimate consequence of the fall of the big
Other: there is no longer anyone, who can tell us exactly what the object
of our desire really is, but this does not mean that we have to “settle” with
either of the two alternatives described above. Roughly put, the Derridean
eternal postponement of justice and the silence of the Other could be
paraphrased as a radically modest interpretation of the consequences of
Lacan’s dictum that desire is always the desire of the Other (because the
answer to the question of the right thing to do must therefore indefinitely
escape us), while the Deleuzian answer is the one of pure immanence in
the sense that “we know very well what we desire, now let’s live it out”.
Our emphasis instead is on the insistence on desire as such – a pure desire,
if you will, one that “unreasonably” goes to the end and asserts itself as
the new, unfounded, but right answer to the eternal question “what should
be done?” A “pure” desire would be one that is not concerned with petty,
subjective, immediate interests, but is desire freed from any binding. It is
not that I demand the right to have my desires satisfied, but that I assume
the right to interpret what is worth desiring in this particular situation.
My claim thereby reaches beyond a subjective urge to live out various ex-
citing alternative forms of enjoyment and into the realm of the universal.
As Lacan himself says, the “pure desire” thus envisioned (maybe surpris-
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ingly) resembles Kant’s categorical imperative, which “looked at more clo-
sely, is simply desire in its pure state, that very desire that culminates in
the sacrifice, strictly speaking, of everything that is the object of love in
one’s human tenderness” (Lacan 1998, 275–276).
That the question of the intersection remains, as Dolar put it, means
that all forms of secure guidance as to what one should do disappear, both
on the side of the law and on the side of desire, but it also means, precisely,
that there is a significant sense in which a place is left open after the fall of
the Other. What the man from the country does not dare, in our reading
of Kafka, is to perform “La Passe” – the passage to the other side. This
other side is not a “transcendent” realm of eternal truth, but it is nonethe-
less something more than a merry acceptance of the conditions in imma-
nent reality. “This entrance was only meant for you” means: you may pass
over into the position of the analyst; there is an opening in the functioning
of the law that permits you to step out from the perspective of pure imma-
nence and regard the establishment of a new law as a pure act on behalf of
the Law. You may assume the perspective of the Law. The Law, in other
words, is a transcendent dimension to immanent reality itself, because of its
fundamental failure to ground itself in a transcendent dimension. The pro-
blem of the intersection remains and opens the perspective of the truly
political. In this sense, the passage into the Law means a transgression of
the law, and simultaneously the only true assertion of the fact that the Law
has fallen. Therefore, the act that reasserts the Law can only do so in a
“headless subjectivation” that transcends the realm of what the subject had
hitherto been clinging to as its desired state. The political act leaves behind
the coordinates of the ancient regime, and it reinvents the very conditions
of anything counting as a political subject: Woman, black, child – and
maybe now the Future Others, as Kojin Karatani has called them; those
that must now be included in our present political concerns in a radically
new way, if we are to avoid a climatic catastrophe, which means that we
must once again reinvent the field of the political without any guarantee
that it will be possible (Karatani 2003: 125). The political subject does not
wait in front of the door of the Law until it dies, nor does it go home and
indulge in creative pleasures, because it has learned that the Law does not
exist. It enters the Law and reinvents itself.
The King must be beheaded twice: The first time as the transcendent,
untouchable sovereign that establishes Law; the second time as the uncon-
scious master soliciting us to remain on the side of the law and enjoy our
lives. A genuine act implies a departure from the contingent coordinates
of the law, whether it be the law of the Other or the law of desire (that
is, one’s own inclinations and interests). In this sense, the political subject
“must step over to the side of the Law”, much as Alenka Zupančič has
described the characteristic of any “real act worthy of the name”. The sub-
ject of such an act is not …
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… a ‘full’ subject who knows exactly what he wants but, rather, […] the subject
‘is realized’, ‘objectified’ in this act: the subject passes over to the side of the
object. The ethical subject is not a subject who wants this object, but, rather, this
object itself. In an act, there is no ‘divided subject’: there is the ‘it’ (the Lacanian
ça) and the subjective figure that arises from it. We may thus conclude that the
act in the proper sense of the word follows the logic of what Lacan calls a ‘head-
less subjectivation’ or a ‘subjectivation without subject’” (Zupančič 2000:
103–104).
In a real act there is something “too much”, which is exactly what allows
the subject to “pass over to the side of the object” – or in our context, to
the side of the Law. The Law becomes accessible only when the subject
fully assumes its inexistence.
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